| 2 expectation of future EU membership has been a source of hope for the troubled country since it established de facto independence in 1999.
With the negotiations on an SAA in progress, Kosovo is one of several Western Balkans countries that are part of the next round of accession to the EU. Like Bosnia, Serbia, and Croatia it is also a country in which the history of conflict is recent and the benefits of EU membership ought to be a strong economic and political enticement to meet the standards necessary for membership. Yet, this is not how things are working out. Instead of major transformation of the post-conflict society towards democratization, economic development and a robust human rights regime, the prospect of
European Union membership appears to be leading to superficial legal changes without enforcement. In Kosovo, as in other countries, EU conditionalities have not had the hoped for transformative effect (Epstein and Jacoby 2014 ). Yet, EU engagement has led to important political changes in Kosovo, key among them being the engagement of Serbia in high level dialogue. This article argues that EU conditionalities, though not leading to societal change in and of themselves, create an opportunity for interest group engagement and the development of a 'watchful constituency' which may eventually lead to the enforcement of laws, that now exist on the books, but are otherwise invisible.
While the focus on a single case, and an unusual one at that, has limitations in terms of generalizability, it allows for a detailed examination of implementation and enforcement of policy changes. Here, the issues faced in Kosovo are compared across Western Balkans countries also engaged in accession processes with the EU. In many ways Kosovo is the least-likely case for political transformation as internal factors suggest that it would face serious challenges. It is not only post-communist, it is also post-conflict and struggling with economic difficulties resulting from | 3 the fact that many countries, even some within the EU, do not formally recognize it. At the same time, Kosovo's history and the significant involvement of both the UN and the EU through the period of supervised independence would appear to make it a most-likely case for reform insofar as its political processes were actually under the control of external actors for a considerable part of its existence as a state.
This article seeks to investigate the tensions between internal challenges to legal change and external pressures for reform, adding to the literature on the decoupling of Europeanization and domestic change in candidate countries. A short analysis of one policy area, women's property rights, illuminates the gaps between legal change and enforcement processes. Women's property rights are a pertinent policy area to examine because they are both a human rights issue and critical to economic development. They are also a specific example of a set of gender related policy concerns promoted by the EU across the Western Balkans countries. The second major contribution of the article is a consideration of how and when a change in law can lead to a change in social and political practices. It is argued here that legal changes in response to EU conditionalities may begin as just window-dressing, but create an opportunity for collective action that can eventually lead to democratic change and a more robust enforcement of law.
Research for this article was conducted over four months in 2012 and 2013 when the author was living in Kosovo and conducting research on property rights. This was followed by further field research in 2014. Though secondary sources are used as noted, much of the data comes from 48 interviews conducted in Kosovo. Interviews on the issues of property rights and legal processes were conducted in Pristina and four different municipalities in Kosovo: Ferizaj/Uroševac, Klinë/Klina, Gračanica/Graçanicë, and Rahovec/Orahovac. The semi-structured interviews were | 6 with its neighbors. All of the Western Balkans states, including Albania, can apply for EU membership. Croatia was the first to complete the accession process on July 1, 2013. Montenegro, Macedonia FYR, and Serbia are all candidate countries for EU accession. EU membership is desirable for all of these countries due to the increased opportunities for economic engagement through trade, access to structural and social cohesion funds, and freedom of movement for their populations. In an ideal world the candidate process creates incentives for countries to reform their political systems and economies in ways which will make them more democratic and create an environment conducive to economic growth. What this would look like in practice is, among other things, clear and egalitarian laws enforced across region, gender, ethnicity and status.
External Pressure for Reform
The decision to allow membership to the Western Balkans countries was made at a European Council meeting in Santa Maria de Feria in 2000 at which the Western Balkans area was identified as part of Europe and having legitimate expectations of EU membership in the future. At that time Kosovo had just fought a war with Serbia, the Bosnian War (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) was in recent memory, and there was a concern to promote political stability and security in the Western Balkans through the influence of the EU. The decision to extend EU membership to the Western Balkans was reaffirmed in 2003 at a meeting of the European Council in Thessaloniki Greece. The Council, "… reiterated its determination to fully and effectively support the European perspective of the Western Balkan countries, which will become an integral part of the EU, once they meet the established criteria ("Presidency Conclusions of the Thessaloniki European Council" 2003: 12) .
Conditionality criteria for countries aspiring to EU membership were first outlined in the Copenhagen Council documents of 1993. The Copenhagen Criteria were influential in the accession | 7 process of the Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries. Some view the conditionality arrangements for these countries as effective as many have continued to progress in areas of democratic reform even after the accession process was completed and they joined the EU (Epstein and Sedelmeier 2009) . However, treating the CEE countries as a bloc in the accession process has not been viewed by all to be positive, given the variation in levels of democratic development in the CEE states. Specifically, the substantial challenges faced by Romania and Bulgaria and the EUs ability to address these through conditionality, was hindered by the consideration of the CEE countries as a whole (Phinnemore 2013) . Thus, a lesson learned from the EU expansion into Central and Eastern Europe was the necessity of treating countries individually and not as a bloc.
The Stabilization and Association Processes (SAP) of Western Balkans countries will involve country by country negotiation on the specifics of reform. Moreover, the conditionality requirements relating to economic and political progress are very high compared to those countries that became part of the EU in the CEE bloc accession process (Pippan 2004 enter into a general debate on the merits of a country as a future member of the Union" (Schimmelfennig 2009: 127) . Indeed, Kelley has argued that only membership conditionality has the capacity to overcome domestic opposition (Kelley 2006) . Kosovo is currently in this critical time period in which we should be able to discern substantial institutional change.
The broad conditionality requirements for Western Balkan countries fall into both political and economic areas. Several critical areas of human rights that are important to the EU and challenging to the Western Balkans countries pertain to gender equality and the treatment of minority populations. While issues of minority protection are ongoing and difficult, it appears that gender equality standards have been achieved, at least legally. Yet, there is an identifiable gap between law and practice on some basic issues of gender equality such as women's economic engagement and property rights.
Addressing equality of opportunity for women is high on the EU human rights agenda across the 
Internal Resistance to Change
While sharing the difficulties faced by other Western Balkans states, Kosovo also faces idiosyncratic challenges with regard to its relationship with the EU. Specifically, international involvement, both through the EU and UNMIK, has not been met with enthusiastic support across the board. Anti-interventionist sentiment is a troublesome obstacle to the success of conditionality. Some scholars have argued that EU conditionalities which oppose nationalist sentiments will never be fully implemented.
"...if conditionality demands do not correspond to the nation's self-definition, the material incentives for compliance will not affect the government's (re-)action to the EU's criteria. The government will stick to what it considers appropriate and will not consider performing actions that are contradictory to the national identityregardless of any cost-benefit calculation. In line with the 'logic of appropriateness', we therefore generally expect political conditionality to be ineffective where it clashes with national identity (no compliance). However, compliance may be the result of profound identity change." (Freyburg and Richter 2010: 267) There is not overwhelming societal support in Kosovo for the reforms that are happening on the way to an EU accession agreement. There is a 'high degree of hostility' towards the EU and its involvement in politics (Papadimitriou and Petrov 2013) despite the fact that many in government are working hard towards the goal of compliance and accession. The end of UNMIK sovereignty led to a desire among some Kosovars for complete independence from outside intervention, even that which is intended to help them towards European integration.
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Institutional Change
States that would like to become part of the EU must undergo a process of changing their political and economic institutions to align themselves with EU values and practices. Through the accession and pre-accession processes states change laws and policies to become more democratic, egalitarian and 'European'. The direct and indirect influence of the European Union has had a positive impact on legal development in Kosovo. However, writing law does not automatically lead to the cooperation of local level courts and municipal officials that is necessary to enforce law (Joireman 2011; Sikor and Lund 2009 ). Whenever we see institutional change that is legal in nature there is a particular concern identified by Peter Hall. When a new piece of legislation is passed, there is a collective action problem that develops in mobilizing the actors who enact or enforce the reforms (Hall 2010) . Indeed, legal change is a unique form of institutional change in that it can be implemented by a narrowly-defined political elite, who may or may not be responding to societal demands. We can think of institutions as being 'born-weak' when the impetus behind them is not a response to demands from a domestic constituency, but rather, to an external constituency We have reason to be wary of time periods with rapid lawmaking as there is unlikely to be a great deal of effort given to coalition building and deliberation (Grzymala-Busse 2011). Levitsky and Murillo argue that laws written during times of rapid change create institutions that are 'born weak' (Levitsky and Murillo 2012) . In Kosovo, laws were passed that served the purpose of asserting the identity of the state and preparing for eventual EU accession arrangements -not laws that were created by a response to demand from below, but rather developed by a narrow group of elites engaged in the process of state-building.
Combining what we know about EU accession processes and the experiences of institutional transition, warrants concern regarding the impact these laws will have on society. EU engagement with post-communist states during a time of rapid change is likely to result in the development of 
Property Rights for Women in Kosovo
In Kosovo, political violence occurred in the midst of a transition from communist rule, leaving a legacy of uncertain property rights. Key among these highly charged political issues are the restoration of property to the Serbian minority population who lived in Kosovo prior to the war, the allocation of formerly socially owned properties, including residences, legalizing the many illegally constructed building in Pristina, and the privatization of large government properties over which Serbia and Kosovo contest ownership, such as the Trepça mine. These are politically charged, legally complex issues, some involving human rights, for which the solutions are not always obvious nor the enforcement mechanisms straightforward. Women's economic and property rights in with European Union requirements. 4 External involvement had a tangible, observable output in the development of a robust legal framework for women's rights.
Though women have legal protections, they frequently renounce their right to inherit family property. 5 While the specifics of how the law is subverted is discussed elsewhere (Joireman 2015) ,
here it is sufficient to note that it is standard practice for adult female children to 'refuse' inherited property rights (1107 2012; 1112 2012; 11713 2013; 1207 2012) . The reasons why this occurs are entwined issues such as strongly differentiated cultural gender norms, the salience of Albanian nationalism and the impact of Albanian customary law (the Kanun), which is deeply patrilineal and a totem of Albanian identity (Joireman 2014) .
If culture is the reason why women have such low levels of property ownership, then public opinion surveys of women should also demonstrate a resounding refusal to inherit property. In the best of 5 Although the provision for the renunciation of inheritance rights is a standard part of most inheritance or probate law, it is rarely used. A person might renounce an inheritance if they felt that a particular plot of land or immovable property would cost them more in terms of taxation and upkeep than it was actually worth. In the case of Kosovo, renunciation of inheritance rights is frequently exercised and not for reasons of taxation or because of the onerous burden of particular properties.
| 17 all worlds, public opinion survey data would be widely available for this issue, but it is not. There has been one large survey of 1050 women dispersed across the country. In this survey women were asked about their preferences for property inheritance among their own children and for themselves.
75% of surveyed women stated that both male and female children should inherit equally (Vuniqi and Halimi 2011: 36) . If it is indeed the case that women believe that inheritance should be for both male and female children, then the explanation as to why women do not own property cannot be simply an issue of choice influenced by cultural norms.
There are a number of issues pertaining to knowledge, process and implementation that create problems for women claiming their property rights. With regards to knowledge, it is clear that women do not always know that they are legally entitled to inherit from their parents, and even from their spouses. When the Vuniqi and Halimi survey asked women if the law supported equal inheritance rights for male and female children (which it does) 41% believed that law did not apply to inheritance issues. Instead, they believed inheritance issues to be governed by tradition and customary law (Vuniqi and Halimi 2011: 19) . The rare practice of female inheritance makes it unlikely that women or their families would know the content of the law.
The second category of legal impediment to women's inheritance of property has to do with the process which the courts follow. Few people make wills in Kosovo; therefore most inheritance cases follow laws on intestacy (1207 2012). After the issuance of a death certificate, any heir of the deceased may renounce their inheritance at any time and many women willingly choose to forego inheritance at this time. Agreements made among family members as to the disposition of property are recognized by the court or public notaries as they facilitate the rapid distribution of the estate.
However, these agreements are often used to exclude of female heirs without their permission, by simply only listing male heirs (1207 2012).
Clearly, ascertaining who the correct legal heirs are would go a long way towards rectifying issues of women's inheritance and property rights. The mechanism for a judge or notary to determine if all heirs were named would be to check the civil registry of the municipality. However, there is an absence of capacity in the civil registry system in Kosovo to identify all the legal heirs and a problem with some of the record which exist. When the war in Kosovo occurred in 1999 Serbian authorities removed the civil and property registers from Kosovo ant took them to Serbia. The original registers remain there. In 2012 as a result of talks between Kosovo and Serbia, some steps towards the normalization of relations began. One of these was a project to bring the copies of the civil registry documents to Kosovo. Beginning in 2012 a process of the verification of the copies of the civil registry records began and is now complete. However, these records are paper and not digitized or easily searchable. Therefore, even a court well-disposed to recognize women's inheritance rights would not necessarily know that sisters or daughters had been excluded in a prior agreement.
The use of family agreements, coupled with the lack of checks for legal heirs, allows the exclusion of women from inheritance. What is particularly interesting is that the same process is also being used to exclude male heirs from a share of the family property (EULEX Interviews 2012). The poor economy in Kosovo has also led to an outmigration of young workers for better jobs in nearby countries. As a result of economic migration it is not uncommon for the heirs of a person who has died intestate to be out of the country. This has led to a number of incidents in which agreements written by families have excluded male heirs, as well as female. There are an increasing number of complaints being brought to the human rights office at the European Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) regarding male heirs excluded in the inheritance process (EULEX Interviews 2012). 
Revisiting Institutional Change in Kosovo
External involvement in Kosovo and the goal of EU membership have led to modern, egalitarian laws as the foundation of the state. This is an important first step in any effective legal regime.
However, the law alone does not effect change, and there is a large gap between the law and its enforcement through the courts and societal adherence. This gap is explained by resistance to laws that contradict cultural norms as well as by the poor functioning of the courts. However, internal impediments need not justify pessimism about the future. In the following paragraphs I will discuss how the creation of law can promote institutional change that is more than window-dressing and follow this with examples of when this has occurred in other contexts.
There are three specific ways in which the presence of appropriate law is helpful in facilitating institutional change. First, the presence of law creates an opportunity for contestation in the courts when it is not enforced. Groups or individuals can bring cases when laws are violated. Even if these cases are not successful, the presence of law allows for the attempt to assert rights that would not otherwise exist. There are examples of this in Kosovo. One that has caught public attention is that of Shyhrete Berisha who is engaged in a legal battle to recover the family home of her late husband. During the war, her village was attacked and her four children and husband were all killed.
She was seriously injured and left the country to get medical treatment. When she returned, she was locked out of the family home by her in-laws. Ms. Berisha is the legal heir and began a 12 year court battle to reclaim the home that has so far yielded no decision (Gashi 2014) . Ms. Berisha's case is famous within Kosovo and evokes much public sympathy because of her suffering during the war and the length of time the courts have taken to resolve the case. Progress has been covered in the media and recently a civil society organization, Levisja FOL, gave her an award for 'Civic Courage" in her ongoing battle to use the courts to enforce her property rights (Levizja FOL 2015) .
Second, laws, even when aspirational or unevenly enforced can create a narrative for the way society ought to be. This can be used by civil society groups and the government as an educational tool.
Returning to the issue of women's inheritance rights, in Kosovo, the Kosovo Women's Network uses the law on inheritance to teach women about what should be happening and the claims that they are legally allowed to make. The Lawyer's Association NORMA has similarly used law to teach citizens about the rights of women to own and inherit property. They have additionally participated in court monitoring activities to assess whether law is being followed.
Lastly, as the judiciary becomes more professional having laws already in place provides a fast track towards change in practice. Judicial improvement could solve the enforcement problem quickly, but it is not easy to achieve. In Kosovo the slow and sometimes corrupt functioning of the courts has been a problem since before independence. Most citizens avoid the courts because of the perception that they are "slow, difficult and expensive" (Skendaj 2014: 75) . In other contexts, civil society has been critical in holding governments accountable for the enforcement of law and has compensated for this sort of democratic deficit (Peruzzotti and Smulovitz 2006) .
Local mobilization around a desired change is a critical means of ensuring state enforcement when the courts are weak or difficult to access. Without citizens organized around an issue addressed by law, a state has no incentive to invest in its enforcement. This is true whether the law is a human rights issue, economic concern or just an ordinance regulating social behavior, such as the Tobacco Law. In other contexts, the development of a watchful constituency of citizens has led to the enforcement of laws and policies that would otherwise have had little effect. An example that pertains to women's property rights, is what happened in Uganda around the 'consent clause' of the Land Act. Women in Uganda did not have property rights to their land and homes under customary law. A Land Act, passed in 1998, gave women the right to obstruct the sale of homes in which they were living and property which provided them with subsistence. While many aspects of the Land Act were not implemented or enforced, the spousal consent clause was. The reason for the enforcement of this particular clause lay in the array of women's organizations, unhappy with the lack of a stronger set of rights, which were carefully watching the implementation of the law (Joireman 2007 Women's Network). In addition there are civil society organizations that are focused on democracy, anti-corruption efforts and human rights such as the previously mentioned Levisja FOL and the Kosovo branch of the Youth Initiative on Human Rights. One might imagine that on an issue of gender equality we might also see transnational networks forming to link national and international activists, but women's property and inheritance rights are not highly visible. There are some linkages between external actors and local civil society organizations, but they largely occur through programmatic funding, for example through the Soros Foundation, Kvinna till Kvinna, and the National Endowment for Democracy or through government based foreign assistance. These funds are not specifically targeted at women's property issues, but more generally at fostering democracy or women's empowerment. The more civil society groups form and engage around | 23
women's economic engagement and political equality, the more likely we are to see the egalitarian laws enforced as these groups create a constituency for reform.
Conclusion
Absent a watchful domestic constituency for enforcement, laws are likely to remain window dressing, particularly if their formation was designed to address an external constituency rather than domestic interests. If EU conditionality is to lead to real institutional change, elite compliance with legislative changes will be a slow path to that goal. Support for change from civil society groups and local actors who support new legislation and public policy will speed the implementation and enforcement.
Examining institutional change in Kosovo from a theoretical perspective, it should not be a surprise that the institutions developed are weak and laws unenforced. Legal change in Kosovo is the result of an exogenous shock that created institutions 'born weak'. Laws were written and passed in a short period of time with the support of a narrow elite and little mass engagement in the specifics of legislative change.
There are two potential futures for these institutions, one involves the development of a coalition around their enforcement in which case the institutional change will be robust. The current weak enforcement of laws on women's property rights in both Kosovo and across the Western Balkans allows these laws to persist and give a necessary time gap in which to create a domestic constituency and the mechanisms for enforcement. If the limited public opinion surveys from Kosovo are correct then there is a latent constituency for reform that can be mobilized. Just because institutions are 'born-weak' does not mean that they will grow up weak. Alternatively, the law that has been
